Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition

报告题目:Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition

报告人:王云增教授加州大学河滨分校安德森商学院院长,终身教授)

时间:2018年1月16日下午14:00-15:30

地点:经管学院206,欢迎相关专业老师和管理科学与工程专业研究生参加!

 

Yunzeng Wang

School of Business Administration and A. GaryAndersonGraduateSchool of Management, University of California at Riverside

“Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition”

 

Abstract: Consider a buyer who would like to procure certain products for current consumption and the underlying technologies so that he can become a supplier and compete with current suppliers in the future market. One potential procurement mechanism for such a buyer is to bundle the procurement project with technology acquisition. We propose a dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model that analyzes the optimal technology oer strategies of the asymmetric suppliers and highlights how the size of the current project, relative to the size of the future market, and supplier competition determine the eectiveness of the bundled procurement

mechanism for the buyer. We find that a project size of 5% to 10% of the future market is sucient for the suppliers to oer their best technologies. Under such conditions, the premium for the buyer to pay for technology acquisition is relatively small, compared to the profit the buyer achieves by becoming a future technology supplier and competing with existing suppliers in the future market.

 

王云增教授是加州大学河滨分校安德森商学院院长, 终身教授。 1986年毕业于哈尔滨工业大学后进入加拿大滑铁卢大学获得管理科学硕士1998年获得沃顿商学院(宾夕法尼亚大学)运营管理专业博士学位先后在德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校加州大学河滨分校任副教授教授并历任副院长和院长他的研究主要关注合同理论博弈理论供应链管理和动态规划,中美经济及教育发展与合作曾在管理科学领域顶级或一流期刊如Operations ResearchManagement ScienceM&SOM等发表多篇论文, 并担任POMS, IIE TransactionsDecision Sciences等国际一流期刊的副主编或高级编辑是领域内国际知名专家