本次研讨会邀请了国内外供应链管理领域的六位教授就目前供应链管理研究的前沿问题展开讨论。具体内容及时间安排如下:
讲座（1）
题 目：Ocean Container Transport Logistics: Challenges and Opportunities
报告人：李忠义教授,香港科技大学
时 间：6月19日（周五）8:40-10:10
地 点：行政楼128会议室
报告摘要：
As supply chains become more global, and more operations are outsourcing and move offshore, ocean container transport now is a critical element of any such supply chain. In particular, due to the tightened security, increased congestion, slow steaming, and heightened pressure on energy usage and carbon emission, the immediate effect of ocean transportation on supply chain has recently attracted much attention. In this talk, I will present a number of problems and related research questions that have been understudied in the literature and yet appear to be challenging for both container shipping service providers and users. Progress of a theme-based research project will also be presented.
报告人简介：
Chung-Yee Lee received a B.S. degree in Electronic Engineering (1972) and a MS degree in Management Sciences (1976) both from National Chiao-Tung University in Taiwan. He also received a M.S. degree in Industrial Engineering from Northwestern University (1980) and Ph.D degree in Operations Research from Yale University (1984). He is currently a Chair Professor/Cheong Ying Chan Professor of Engineering with the Department of Industrial Engineering and Logistics Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). He is the Founding and Current Director of Logistics and Supply Chain Management Institute at HKUST. He served as Department Head for seven years (2001–2008). Before joined HKUST in 2001, he was Rockwell Chair Professor at Texas A&M University. He is a Fellow of the Institute of Industrial Engineers in U.S. and also a Fellow of Hong Kong Academy of Engineering Sciences. His search areas are in logistics and supply chain management, scheduling and inventory management. He has published more than 140 papers in refereed journals. According to an article in Int. J. Prod. Eco.(2009), which looked at all papers published in the 20 core journals during last 50 years in the field of production and operations management, he was ranked No. 6 among all researchers worldwide in h-index.
讲座（2）
题 目：Sequential selling and information dissemination in the presence of network effects
报告人：陈滢儒副教授, 香港科技大学
时 间：6月19日（周五）10:30-12:00
地 点：行政楼128会议室
报告摘要：
In this paper, we examine how a seller sells a product/service with a positive consumption externality, and customers are uncertain about the product's/service's value. Because early adopters learn this value, we consider the customers' intrinsic signaling incentives and positive feedback effects. Anticipating this, the seller commits to provide price discounts to the followers, and charges the leader a high price. Thus, the profit-maximizing pricing features the cream skimming strategy. We also show that the lack of seller's commitment is detrimental to the social welfare; nonetheless, the sequential selling still boosts up the seller's profit compared with the simultaneous-selling case.
Embedding a physical network with arbitrary payoff externality among customers, we investigate the optimal targeting strategy in the presence of information asymmetry. We provide precise indices for this leader selection problem. For undirected graphs, we should simply choose the player with the highest degree, irrespective of the seller's commitment power. Going beyond this family of networks, in general the seller's commitment power affects the optimal targeting strategy. We also consider the general hierarchical design problem of information dissemination and prove the optimality of chain structure.
报告人简介：
Ying-Ju Chen holds a joint appointment between School of Business and Management (Department of ISOM) and School of Engineering (Department of IELM) at HKUST. Prior to the current position, he was a faculty in the Department of IEOR at UC Berkeley. He obtained a PhD degree in Operations Management from Stern School of Business at New York University in 2007, and he also holds master's and bachelor's degrees of Electrical Engineering from National Taiwan University.
He is a recipient of NYU teaching excellence award, Harold W. Kuhn Award of Naval Research Logistics, Second place of INFORMS Junior Faculty Interest Group (JFIG) paper competition, Best paper award of CSAMSE (third prize), the Harold MacDowell Award from Stern School, and other awards and fellowships during his academic journey. His current research interests lie in socially responsible operations, operations-marketing interface, and supply chain management. His work has appeared in several leading conferences and journals in the fields of accounting, economics, electrical engineering, information systems, marketing, and operations research.
讲座（3）
题 目：大数据环境下商务管理的思考
报告人：陈剑教授，清华大学
时 间：6月19日（周五）13:30-15:00
地 点：行政楼128会议室
报告摘要：
“大数据”一词出现后即受到各方的追捧。人们预期它将对国家治理、企业决策、组织和业务流程以及个人的生活等方方面面产生巨大的影响。本报告试图从商务管理的视角，分析大数据所带来的商务模式变革以及相应的挑战，并提出大数据环境下的商务管理方面值得思考和研究的问题。
报告人简介：
陈剑教授，清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程系联想讲席教授（Lenovo Chair Professor）、博士生导师，清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程系系主任，教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地——清华大学现代管理研究中心主任。于 1983 年获得清华大学电机系学士学位，1986 年获得清华大学自动化系硕士学位，1989 年获得清华经济管理学院博士学位。主要研究领域为供应链管理、电子商务、商务智能与决策分析、系统优化与预测技术等。
讲座（4）
题 目：Two Newsvendors with Inventory Transshipment under Limited Supply
报告人：戴悦教授，复旦大学
时 间：6月19日（周五）15:20-16:50
地 点：行政楼128会议室
报告摘要：
Inventory transshipment between two newsvendors may generate a higher profit and has been shown to influence the newsvendors' strategic inventory decisions. We study a supply chain with inventory transshipment where two newsvendors place orders to a common supplier whose capacity is limited. If the newsvendors' total order quantity exceeds the capacity, all available supply will be allocated to them according to a pre-announced rule. After the demand is realized, the surplus inventory of one newsvendor may be transshipped, at an exogenous and fixed price, to the other newsvendor who has excess demand. In this newsvendor game, a Nash equilibrium of ordering decisions does not always exist. We investigate conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we show that the total newsvendor profit at the Nash equilibrium is non-decreasing in the supply capacity. Moreover, in some special cases, we identify the appropriate allocation rules such that the first-best inventory stocks under unlimited supply may lead to first-best inventory allocation under limited supply. An interesting effect of the supply constraint is that, inventory transshipment may not always benefit both newsvendors in terms of equilibrium profit, compared to the game under the same supply constraint but without inventory transshipment. Nevertheless, we show that at least one newsvendor can still benefit from inventory transshipment. Accordingly, we construct a coordinating contract that allows the newsvendors to negotiate the transshipment prices before placing orders to maximize the total profit such that both newsvendors can benefit from inventory transshipment.
报告人简介：
戴悦，复旦大学管理学院管理科学系教授。主要研究方向为供应链管理,博弈论等，目前关注于市场营销和供应链管理的交互研究。研究成果发表于Marketing Science，Production and Operations Management等国际期刊上。研究课题包括国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目，教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”，及多项国际课题。负责讲授各个层次的供应链管理和运营管理课程。她于美国北卡罗莱纳州立大学工业工程系获得博士学位。
讲座（5）
题 目：Price Matching Negotiation in Competitive Channels
报告人：蔡港树副教授，Santa Clara University（美国）
时 间：6月20日（周六）8：30-10:00
地 点：行政楼128会议室
报告摘要：
In price matching negotiation (PM), a channel matches its price with the resulting whole- sale price bargained earlier by the other channel. We investigate this negotiation mechanism and compare it with two benchmarks, simultaneous negotiation (SN) and sequential negotiation (SQ). Through a common-seller two-buyer Bertrand competition model, we find that in PM the seller prefers to negotiate with the less powerful buyer, whereas in SQ the seller prefers to negotiate with the more powerful buyer first. Firms have different preferences for PM and the benchmarks, and their discrepancy is irreconcilable. With side payment or profit sharing coordination, however, PM can emerge as a mutually beneficial choice for all firms as compared to SN and SQ. We also study seller collusion in a bilateral channel model and find that PM incurs fewer collusion incentives than SN and SQ. When the buyers have asymmetric market sizes, ceteris paribus, the seller prefers to negotiate with the bigger buyer in PM. We finally demonstrate that our main qualitative results are robust in Cournot competition.
报告人简介：
Bio: Dr. Gangshu Cai (蔡港树) is a tenured associate professor in Operations Management and Information Systems at Santa Clara University. He is the Faculty Director of Graduate Business Programs of Leavey School of Business. Dr. Cai received his B.S. in physics from Peking University and his M.S. in business statistics and economics from the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University, and earned his Ph.D. in operations research from North Carolina State University. His research has been financially supported by the National Science Foundation of U.S.A. and the National Natural Science Foundation of China. He has published in Marketing Science, Production and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, and Decision Sciences. He is the recipient of the Best Paper Award of Fifth International Conference on Electronic Commerce, Kansas State University President’s Faculty Development Award, CBA Fellowship, CBA Outstanding Contributions in Research Award, and Santa Clara University Dean's Award for Scholarship Excellence. He has also won a number of teaching awards in both public and private universities, including Ralph Reitz Outstanding Teaching Award in Kansas State University (one per year in the business school) and Leavey Impact Award for Teaching (at most one per year in the business school) and multiple Dean's Award for Teaching Excellence in Santa Clara University. He is an Associate Editor and guest Senior Editor of Decision Sciences Journal and Editorial Board Member of Production and Operations Management Journal.
讲座（6）
题 目：Opaque Distribution Channels for Competing Service Providers: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanisms
报告人：陈荣副教授，University of California at Davis（美国）
时 间：6月20日（周六）10:20-11:50
地 点：行政楼128会议室
报告摘要：
Opaque selling has been widely adopted by service providers in the travel industry to sell off leftover capacity under stochastic demand. We consider a two stage model to study the impact of different selling mechanisms, Posted Price (PP) vs. Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP), of an opaque reseller on competing service providers who face forward-looking customers. We find that in this environment, providers prefer that the opaque reseller uses a posted price instead of a bidding model. This is because the ability to set retail prices is critical for extracting surplus from customers who wait to purchase from the reseller. Such surplus extraction enables providers to set high prices for advance sales and obtain high profits. The dominance of PP over NYOP disappears, however, when competition between sellers is minimal or absent. We extend our model to multiple opaque resellers who compete in selling off last-minute capacity for service providers, and find that our main insights continue to hold with differentiated resellers. Despite providers’ preference in favor of PP, there are circumstances under which the opaque reseller earns higher profits under NYOP. Leisure customers might also prefer the bidding mechanism, which allows them to retain some surplus. This can help explain the rapid growth of the NYOP model over the last decade. Our findings are consistent with the evolution of opaque selling in the travel industry, and in particular, the recent trend towards more published price sales for opaque products.
报告人简介：
Rachel R. Chen is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Management at University of California at Davis. She received her Ph.D. from the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University in 2003. Her research focuses on e-procurement and distribution in supply chains and the pricing of service operations. She has been a member of INFORMS since 1999.
